I. INTRODUCTION
The path-based DoS attack was first described in detail and named by Deng et. al. in [4] . They pointed out that a PDoS attack, by exhausting the batteries of several nodes, has the potential to disable a much wider region than simply a single path due to the standard tree structure topology of a WSN. WSNs tend to be unstable and have limited resource capacity and so are vulnerable to DoS attacks. Figure 1 shows how PDoS attacks work. A standard PDoS attack begins with the compromise of member nodes and aggregator nodes which are then used to flood the intermediate and sink nodes with packets along the routing paths. The resulting excessive power consumption can lead to a quick death of a WSN because the nodes are unable to return to sleep mode in order to conserve power.
Few authors have tackled the problem of PDoS attacks on a WSN. In this paper, we introduce a novel method of using mobile agents in the WSN which permit us to detect these attacks. To our knowledge, the only application of mobile agents in sensor networks to appear in the literature is in the paper of Tong [8] , but these are not used for of attack.
Our methods are described in detail in sections 2 and 3. In section 4, we evaluate the usefulness of our techniques and in section 5, describe work which remains for future papers. We assume the WSN has a tree-structure topology, a single base station and four types of nodes as shown in Figure 2 . A description of the node and base station functions can be found in [6] .
We add a mobile agent (MA) to the WSN (several may be added in a large system) and assume that there is no restriction on its computing power.
The work of [8] demonstrates that mobile agents (MAs) are very useful in WSNs because of their ability to reduce network load, encapsulate protocols and are robust and fault-tolerant. We assume that the base station and MA are trusted and can never be compromised by attackers.
In order to distinguish between nodes which have been compromised and those which have not, we need to introduce a labeling for each node. We base this labeling on 3-dimensional co-ordinates in space [7] , which can be obtained by geographical location using triangulation. For example, a node whose coordinates are 59°Latitude, 29°Longitude and height 2 metres has ID 59:29:2. We assume that nodes cannot be positioned in the same geographical location. More recently, en-route filtering schemes have been proposed for intermediate nodes to filter false data generated by malicious aggregator nodes as well as to detect intruders engaged in what we have termed PDoS attacks [9] [10] . The basic idea is that the intermediate nodes share some keys with the member nodes in a node group or cluster. Member nodes generate MACs for the reported data using the shared keys, and intermediate nodes can verify the MACs before forwarding packets. In the SEF scheme proposed by Ye et. al., the Bloom filter [9] is used to reduce the size of MACs and ensure their security. The intermediate nodes and member nodes use randomly pre-distributed keys to generate and verify MACs. In this scheme, it is highly likely that the false data will be dropped by one of the intermediate nodes and will not reach the base station. However, there are several problems with the SEF scheme. First, SEF uses a probabilistic approach. It cannot guarantee that every spurious packet will be filtered out on the path. In addition statistically, a spurious packet will be forwarded for a certain number of nodes before it is filtered out. Second, the message overhead of SEF is still large. The size of the Bloom filter is 14 bytes long, which is about half of the data payload of a TinyOS packet.
Jing et. al. [4] developed a method of using one-way hash chains to protect end-to-end communications in WSNs against PDoS attacks. It prevents PDoS attacks from the intermediate nodes or from outside sources capable of launching PDoS attacks, since an adversary cannot generate the next valid OHC number, while replayed old OHC numbers will be dropped. Second, the memory and computational costs of OHC execution are quite lightweight. Third, this scheme tolerates packet losses. But there are also some obvious disadvantages. One of them is it cannot constrain PDoS attacks by the compromised nodes in WSNs, especially the nodes which store the hash function.
All of the work using MACS results in high local computing costs and subsequent death of nodes. The interleaved key scheme has extremely high communication overhead. We therefore adapt the low cost one-way hash chain idea of Jing et. al., but efficiently employ a mobile agent to detect if the sender of the hash has been compromised.
Our detection solution includes a one-way hash chain, a traffic control algorithm, detection of node compromise and node failure and a voting algorithm. We choose the one-way hash chain as it has low computational requirements and is easy to deploy [4] . The one-way hash chain is used to detect any compromised node except for source nodes. We use a traffic control algorithm to detect the misbehavior of source nodes since the adversary could compromise them to access the one-way hash function. We also use message broadcasting from the MA to distinguish between node failure and node compromise, because node failure which is a technical problem rather than an attack could generate higher traffic flow in a local area or along some paths. Finally, a voting algorithm is used to decide whether suspicious nodes have been compromised based on the votes from their neighbour nodes.
A. TRAFFIC CONTROL ALGORITHM
When one node wants to send packets to its neighbour nodes, not only will it include a hash function value, but also it includes its node ID in order to let the MA recognize the source of packets and record them into a traffic table. In Table 1 , for each 5 second interval, the number of packets passing through the corresponding node is given in the column. If the traffic in each interval is normal, that is, below a certain given threshold W, the MA will simply delete the contents of the table and refresh it for the next time-frame. If the traffic of certain nodes in the table is abnormal (i.e. is above W), the MA will take further steps to tell whether the node has failed or been compromised. The algorithm below detects abnormal traffic by choosing a threshold W and counting the number of times the traffic through a specific node exceeds W in a fixed table. If this occurs more than say w times, the MA then considers the node to be compromised or failed, but cannot tell which.
(The values of w and W can be set initially and adjusted using experimental information over time.) Let T be the number of intervals in the The procedure for Node Failure Detection is described in the next section.
B. DETECTION FOR NODE FAILURE
Both node compromise and node failure can lead to abnormal traffic flow during a short period or in a localized area of a WSN. So we have to eliminate the node failure condition in order to make our Traffic Control algorithm work well. When the MA goes into PROCEDURE NodeFailureDetection, it will simply broadcast a check message to all the nodes in the WSN. The MA counts the number of acknowledgment (ACK) packets received and compares with the number of nodes which do not reply, in order to determine the failed nodes. Responding nodes include their IDs and this allows the MA to determine the IDs of the non-responding nodes. The MA concludes that all non-responding nodes have failed and reports this to a technical support team.
C. VOTING ALGORITHM FOR NODE COMPROMISE
In this section, we now determine which of the nodes that did respond to the MA message are in fact compromised. To do this, we use the MA to broadcast a new random message at random times to all the responding nodes exhibiting abnormal traffic patterns. When these nodes receive this message, they will try to send the same message to their neighbor nodes. However, as described in the well-known Byzantine Generals Problem [5] , compromised nodes will attempt to transmit conflicting information to other parts of the system. We base our voting algorithm on this fact: if node A receives the same message from node B and the MA, node A will vote that node B is not compromised and send back this voting result along with both IDs to the MA. When the MA has received a certain number of votes against a node, the MA will decide that node has been compromised. The MA now takes steps to recover the compromised node. Figure 3 shows how voting algorithm for node compromise works. We can assume that the WSN has sufficient nodes to make such a voting algorithm reliable. On the other hand, in very large-scale WSNs, there could be thousands of nodes, in which case several MAs could be applied in order to implement the detection algorithm. One advantage of using MAs is that they can provide seamless technology to a very big network. So there are no problems in deploying more of them into WSNs.
In addition, node compromise is a fairly slow process, as mentioned in [2] when detection methods are in place. Thus it is unlikely, that at any given time, more than half the nodes would be compromised.
IV. EVALUATION
For our simulation model we generate 50 nodes in a 200x200m square area. The radio transmission range is 40 meters and the data rate of the wireless link is 2Mbps. The data traffic is generated by constant bit rate with an interarrival time of 25ms. For each node there are two transmission queues, one for control packets and one for data packets. The control queue is used for control packets such as route requests and it always has higher priority than the data queue. We also set up a timer if a packet has not reached the destination in 10 seconds. The packet length for data packets is 10kbits with 500 bits for the header message. The queue length for data packets is 50 for all nodes. The timer which is used to resend the message if there is no reply is set to 50 ms. Figure 5 compares the time to detect attacks between our method, the en-route filtering method and the SEF method. We measure the detection time in seconds and the attack rate in SYN/sec.
As indicated, our method is significantly better than the others when the attack rate is between 17 SYN/sec and 28 SYN/sec. As indicated, our method is significantly better than the others when the attack rate is between 16 SYN/sec and 28 SYN/sec. For large attack rates, we can see it spends less time to detect it. Figure 6 shows the energy comparison between each detection method. We can see our method cost less energy on detect the attacks.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have presented a new detection method for node compromise in PDoS attacks in a WSN and evaluated our results, based on small WSNs, including comparison with other work. Our work demonstrates the efficiency of our detection methods in comparison with existing methods when only a few nodes have been compromised.
In future work, we will implement these methods in largescale WSNs. We will also use mobile agents to develop response and recovery methods in PDoS attacks
